



**“Beyond Compliance: Modern Oversight and the Evolution of
Adequate and Effective Policing”**

Keynote Address by Inspector General Ryan Teschner

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Good morning, everyone.

Thank you to Osgoode Professional Development, to our program chairs, Ian Bulmer and Maureen Salama, for the invitation to join you today. And thank you to all of you for being here. It is particularly nice for me to be back at Osgoode.

More than twenty years ago, I sat where many law students sit today, learning how legal frameworks are built, interpreted and applied. Earlier in my career, I also had the opportunity to contribute to policing policy and legislative reform efforts that ultimately helped shape the modernized policing and oversight framework that exists in Ontario today, under the Community Safety and Policing Act.

At the time, much of that work was necessarily conceptual. How should accountability function? What responsibilities should rest with police services, police boards, and oversight bodies? How do we create institutions capable of maintaining public confidence while adapting to changing expectations, new risks and an increasingly complex public safety environment?

Today, as Ontario's first Inspector General of Policing under the Community Safety and Policing Act, I have the privilege of seeing those questions from an entirely different perspective.

And, so, I would like to share some insights with all of you that I've gained not from the chair of a law student in the lecture hall, but from the chair of a first-of-its-kind oversight body in Canada.

Because writing the law is one thing. Watching it encounter and interact with the real world is something else entirely.

A legislative framework can look very orderly on paper. The real test begins when the first complaint comes through the door or the first inspection is launched. When a police service board asks what a new obligation means. When the first Decision has to apply a new statutory requirement to actual facts and withstand judicial scrutiny. Or, when the data suggests that what appears to be a local issue may actually be a province-wide pattern that needs to be addressed.

That is where Ontario finds itself today. Not in the blueprint stage anymore. The police oversight framework that was being created and growing, has now entered the real world, and is a real house, with real people in it, functioning in the community we serve.

The Community Safety and Policing Act has now been in force for approximately two and a half years. We have moved beyond implementation and into a much more consequential phase.

From framework to practice.

Today, I want to speak about what we are learning as that transition occurs. About how Ontario's modernized policing framework is operating in practice. About what the first Decisions, complaints, inspections, monitoring activities, research and data are telling

us. And about how independent oversight can help strengthen governance, improve performance and reinforce public confidence in policing.

You are going to spend the rest of today examining a number of specific policing issues, including body-worn cameras, suspensions, disclosure, less-lethal force, police defences and applicable administrative law principles and developments.

Those discussions are important.

But, I want us to step back and look at the broader framework that now connects many of these specific themes and issues. At the centre of that framework is a question that Ontario's policing sector is increasingly being asked to answer:

What does it mean to provide adequate and effective policing in Ontario?

Admittedly, this term — “adequate and effective policing” — was like the Polkaroo. It appeared, some people saw it for a moment, and then it disappeared and no one was the wiser or really saw its impact. People, even leaders in the policing sector, did not know what it meant. But, now, things are coming into focus.

The concept now includes a new generally applicable standard, built expressly around reasonableness and context. We have requirements that quantitative and qualitative information inform that assessment.

We also, under the CSPA and Adequacy and Effectiveness Regulation, have new governance, supervision and quality-assurance obligations.

And, for the first time, Ontario has an Inspector General of Policing with a mandate not only to inspect and issue Directions, but to monitor, advise, research, analyze, investigate complaints, and pro-actively identify risks across the policing system.

So the question is no longer simply: What does the statute say?

Increasingly, we need to ask: What does the standard mean in practice? How do we know when it is being met? What evidence should inform that assessment? What responsibilities sit with the police service boards, chiefs of police, and within policing organizations themselves to embed “adequacy and effectiveness” into governance and policing operational decision-making?

And importantly: What should modern oversight do when it sees risk developing — before that risk becomes a more significant concern?

Let me start with the environment in which all of this is happening. My assessment continues to be that Ontario has a fundamentally strong policing system. But strong systems can be under pressure. And some of the pressures we are seeing are not temporary.

Police organizations are responding to increasingly complex calls involving mental health, addictions, homelessness and vulnerability. They are also responding to increasingly complex public safety challenges, including hate-motivated incidents, public

order events that are larger and more sophisticated, forms of violent extremism, and increasingly complex criminal investigations.

These issues often require police services to draw on a range of statutory policing functions, including prevention, enforcement, public order maintenance, intelligence and community engagement. At the same time, there are continuing workforce, wellness, recruitment, retention and succession pressures across the sector.

Major public events are placing greater demands on specialized resources. Police service boards are being asked to exercise increasingly complex governance responsibilities in an environment where risks can emerge and evolve quickly.

And all of this is happening at a time when public expectations around transparency, accountability, performance and public confidence continue to rise.

Our province-wide public order inspection provides one concrete example. Between 2018 and 2022, Public Order Unit deployments in Ontario increased by 184 per cent. Our inspection found a system that was working generally well. Units were responding within reasonable timeframes and fulfilling their responsibilities.

But it also found a system showing signs of strain through increased demand, cost pressures, officer fatigue and recruitment challenges. That distinction matters.

Something does not need to be failing today for us to identify a risk to its sustainability tomorrow. And increasingly, that is where modern oversight can add value.

Not only by understanding where failures have occurred, but by identifying pressures, vulnerabilities and emerging risks before they become larger systemic issues.

I think that is one of the most important shifts in modern oversight.

Traditionally, oversight has often focused on determining whether there has been a failure to comply. That remains important.

But increasingly, we also need to ask: What are the conditions that could lead to non-compliance? Can we identify those conditions early enough to do something about them?

In many respects, that is what Ontario's modernized oversight framework is designed to do.

Our work at the Inspectorate of Policing over the past two years has reinforced that point and built the desire to answer that question into our DNA.

We continue to see variation in how police services and police service boards assess performance. The complaints we received have shown recurring concerns relating to service delivery, investigative quality and response times.

And as we collect more province-wide information through complaints, inspections, monitoring, advisory work, research and data analysis, we are increasingly able to

identify connections that may not be visible from the perspective of any single organization.

That matters because policing is increasingly interconnected.

A resource decision in one part of an organization can become a response-time issue. A response-time issue can become a public confidence issue. A technology procurement can engage training requirements, use-of-force considerations, governance responsibilities and legal risk simultaneously.

Increasingly, issues rarely exist in isolation.

We are also seeing the value of our real-time monitoring and advisory functions in identifying issues while they are still developing and supporting police chiefs and boards in navigating them well.

In some instances, our advisors become aware of emerging concerns through engagement with police services and boards before a formal issue manifests or a complaint is filed. That information may be reinforced by complaint trends, data analysis, research or other monitoring activities occurring across the province.

Traditional oversight models often engage reactively, after an issue has already occurred. Ontario's modernized oversight framework, and the philosophy I have tried to bring to my role as Inspector General, allows us to apply those traditional tools while also developing a more current understanding of emerging risks and pressures across the policing system.

Modern oversight has to be capable of seeing those pressures and risks as they develop, identifying issues early, understanding how they connect across the policing system, and responding before they become broader systemic concerns.

And that brings me to the role of the Inspector General. The mandate established under the Community Safety and Policing Act is unique. As Inspector General, I am responsible for overseeing both the delivery of policing and the governance of policing – and no oversight body in Ontario, and arguably in Canada, has that same dual role, overseeing both sides of the policing house.

That dual responsibility matters because policing performance and police governance are often discussed separately. But, in practice, they are interconnected.

Governance decisions can affect operational performance. Operational issues can raise governance questions and lead to governance decisions. And, both ultimately affect public confidence in policing.

That means the IoP's work necessarily extends to police services, chiefs of police and police service boards.

We investigate complaints. We conduct inspections. We monitor compliance with the legislation and regulations. We provide advice and support. We conduct research and analysis. We collect and assess data. We publish Decisions. And where necessary, we

can issue binding Directions to address non-compliance by both police chiefs and boards.

What makes the model particularly significant is that these functions are connected. Complaints, inspections, monitoring, advisory activities, governance oversight, research and analytics are not separate exercises, or, to borrow a constitutional law phrase, “watertight compartments.”

They are different ways of understanding the complete system. And in my view, that is one of the most important features of the Inspector General’s statutory mandate.

But there is another aspect of the statutory framework that I believe is equally significant.

The mandate contains both a rearward-looking and a forward-looking dimension. Section 125 – the IG’s authority to issue binding directions – does not limit action to situations in which non-compliance has already occurred. The legislation also allows these binding directions to be issued where there is evidence that an entity is likely to fail to comply with its legal obligations.

Importantly, including from a public confidence perspective, the authority is not only about remedying non-compliance after the fact. It is also about preventing non-compliance from occurring in the first place.

It shows the Legislature explicitly contemplated risk, not just after-the-fact non-compliance. And that is an important signal about the type of oversight framework Ontario has chosen to create.

We are expected to assess what happened, but we are also expected to understand what is happening now. And that is why independent oversight must be capable of looking beyond individual incidents and understanding broader patterns across the policing system.

We are also given tools to understand what is happening now, and what may happen next.

The Inspector General is the statutory decision-maker, and the Inspectorate of Policing provides the operational capacity that supports that role through inspections, investigations, monitoring, advisory functions, research, analytics and data intelligence.

What makes the model particularly valuable is that those functions are not operating independently of one another. They provide different ways of understanding the same system.

A complaint may identify a recurring issue. Data may indicate that the same issue is appearing in multiple jurisdictions. Our advisors may be hearing similar concerns from police services or police service boards that suggest a systemic pattern.

Research may identify a broader trend or reveal that Ontario lacks a common approach to measuring or tackling the issue. That information can support additional monitoring. It

may lead to an inspection. And where non-compliance or risk of non-compliance is identified, it may ultimately result in a Direction.

When those functions are connected, we develop a more complete understanding of what is occurring across the policing system.

That is a very different model than one in which an oversight body first becomes involved only after a significant failure has already occurred.

It allows us to better understand emerging risks, identify patterns earlier, and support compliance and continuous improvement before larger issues develop.

And that takes me to something I have been speaking about more: collaborative oversight.

Independent oversight does not require distance from the realities of the system being overseen. In my view, effective oversight depends on understanding those realities.

We need to understand the operational environment in which police services and police service boards are functioning. We need to understand where legislative requirements are creating practical questions. We need to hear where boards and chiefs are seeing emerging pressures and challenges. And we need communities to tell us how policing is being experienced.

Put simply, oversight is more effective when it is informed, up close and personal, by those it oversees, and by those that consume our oversight.

Regulated entities should have clarity about expectations before, not only after, an issue becomes serious.

Collaboration provides context. And sometimes that context allows an issue to be addressed before it develops into a larger compliance concern. It can also appropriately, and without compromising independence, inform how to approach current or anticipated compliance issues.

I have often said that independent oversight should not be feared.

It should be understood as a mechanism for strengthening governance, improving performance and reinforcing public confidence.

That is also where our right-touch approach comes in.

Not every issue presents the same level of risk. Not every compliance concern calls for the same response. And not every opportunity for improvement needs to become a strict enforcement action.

The objective is not to use the strongest tool available. The objective is to use the appropriate tool for the issue before us.

So, with the backdrop of who we are, what this modern oversight framework in Ontario means, and my philosophy in applying it, we come to an important question: what does “adequate and effective policing” mean anyway?

Section 11 of the Community Safety and Policing Act identifies the policing functions that must be provided in accordance with provincial standards.

Regulation 392/23 – the “Adequate and Effective Policing” Regulation – then does something important.

Its new Generally Applicable Standard provides that a policing function must be delivered in a manner and to an extent that is reasonable, having regard to five codified factors:

- the policing needs of the community;
- local geographic and socio-demographic characteristics;
- how the function is effectively provided in similar Ontario communities;
- the service's own past effectiveness; and,
- best practices.

And the Regulation provides that consideration of those factors is to be informed by quantitative and qualitative information, to the extent that information is available.

I think there are a few important implications that flow from this new standard and how it has been interpreted and applied already. The first is that reasonableness is necessarily contextual.

Ontario is a large and diverse province. Communities deserve quality and responsive policing. Adequate and effective policing will not look identical in Toronto, Thunder Bay, Cobourg or a remote northern community.

I have often said that policing is not a one-size-fits-all enterprise. The particular needs of one community may not be the same as those of another. And in my view, that is the magic of democratic policing.

The second implication is that adequate and effective policing is not only about the moment of service delivery. When something breaks at the end of that chain, modern oversight should be capable of asking where the weakness actually sits. In other words, we need to understand not only what happened, but what contributed to it further up that chain.

And the third implication is that evidence matters. If the standard requires me to consider community need, comparative effectiveness, past performance and best practices, then we need information capable of supporting those assessments.

Evidence is not separate from the standard. It is part of how the standard is applied. And that is one of the reasons why data, research, performance measurement and analysis have become increasingly important components of modern policing oversight. We need real information to be considered as evidence in applying the legal standard I am required by law to apply.

What makes all of this particularly significant is that the Inspector General must ultimately determine whether a policing function hits the reasonable mark established by the legislation.

And, already and over time, these IG Decisions are creating precedent and guidance, and an emerging body of interpretation for the sector that did not previously exist.

These Decisions are helping actually define and concretize what adequate and effective policing and governance means in practice, and shaping how Ontario's modernized policing framework is understood and applied.

Nowhere is that movement more visible than in the Inspector General Decisions.

These Decisions represent some of the first interpretations and applications of the CSPA.

And because these Decisions have precedential value to inform future matters, their significance is not confined to the police service, police service board or complainant involved in a particular case.

When I released my first Decisions, I encouraged every police service and police service board in Ontario to establish a process for reviewing them and considering whether the principles being articulated had implications for their own operations, governance and performance.

That is part of how a new legislative framework develops. A statute provides the framework. Regulations provide greater specificity. Advisory guidance communicates expectations and interpretation. And, binding Decisions apply those requirements to real facts, real circumstances, and real choices being made by police services and boards.

Over time, they create guidance and a growing body of interpretation that did not previously exist for the sector.

Before I go further, I should offer one brief caveat.

As the statutory decision-maker, I need to be careful about saying too much about individual Decisions beyond what is already contained in the published reasons.

The Decisions speak for themselves.

Or, since I am among fellow lawyers, let me speak our language: *res ipsa loquitur*.

My purpose this morning is not to revisit individual matters. Rather, I want to step back and look at some of the areas where these early Decisions are beginning to breathe practical meaning to the CSPA.

And I see at least three themes.

Theme One: Reasonableness is assessed in context.

The Decision involving Waterloo Regional Police Service released on December 17, 2025 involved a complaint alleging that the Service had failed to take adequate enforcement action against illegal cannabis dispensaries.

My finding was compliance. The Decision recognized that Waterloo had not only met the applicable legal requirements, but demonstrated strong policing through its coordination with external partners, use of judicial authorizations and communication with the complainant.

There is also an important principle in that Decision with broader application. Adequate and effective policing is assessed using a reasonableness standard – and that standard, much like the reasonableness standard in the context of judicial review – asks whether the delivery of a policing function falls within a range of appropriate responses in context, rather than requiring perfection.

A Decision involving Hamilton Police Service released July 30, 2026 required the application of that standard in a very different context.

That complaint did not identify a particular incident. It raised concerns about the general approach to policing in Hamilton's downtown core since 2020, including alleged reduced patrol presence, increased violent crime and delays in answering and responding to 911 calls.

My finding was that Hamilton complied with the CSPA and its regulations and delivered policing services in a reasonable manner. The Decision considered information that was collected during the investigation concerning dedicated foot patrol resources, officer availability, violent-crime information, 911 call volumes and response times.

It also identified Hamilton's data-driven approach to resource deployment, crime prevention and community engagement, as well as the Board's role in establishing strategic priorities informed by public consultation.

These are very different factual circumstances. But, taken together, they demonstrate something important about applying the generally applicable standard: reasonableness is assessed in the relevant context, and that context is increasingly becoming information rich.

The CSPA does not require every community in Ontario to be policed in precisely the same way.

But it does give us a framework for assessing whether policing is being provided adequately and effectively and whether the approach taken is reasonable in the circumstances.

Theme Two: Adequate and Effective Policing Depends on the Systems That Support Its Delivery

A second theme emerges from Decisions where the complaint begins with a particular occurrence, but the investigation necessarily engages broader requirements surrounding the delivery of policing.

The Decision involving Niagara Regional Police Service and Board released on July 30, 2026 is an important example.

The complaint arose from a 911 cellular call. It alleged that officers were not dispatched after the call was received. The caller was found deceased several hours later.

The findings of non-compliance concerned the requirements for adequate and effective policing relating to call-taking and dispatch, as well as the implementation of a Quality Assurance Process by the police board and service.

The Directions went beyond the circumstances of that individual call. They required systemic changes to silent-call procedures, enhanced training, strengthened supervisory oversight, improvements to quality assurance policies and procedures, and ongoing reporting to me on implementation of my Directions.

Remember: a section 107 investigation is not an individual police conduct process.

Instead, our focus is the overall delivery of policing and governance and compliance with the CSPA and its regulations. So, an individual occurrence may be where the matter begins. But, the investigation may engage the procedures, training, supervision and quality assurance that surround the delivery of that policing function by that organization in a broader sense.

Put another way: a complaint allows us to zoom out, examine the system in which that policing function is delivered, and ultimately determine whether the system is healthy enough, or requires improvement in the performance of the service's operational mandate, and board's governance function.

The Decision involving Peel Regional Police Service released on December 27, 2025 engages some of those same broader considerations from a different direction.

Peel Regional Police had undertaken internal training and due diligence before authorizing officers to carry and use the PepperBall system.

Those efforts were acknowledged. But, no provincially prescribed training existed for the system, and, therefore, I found that the internal training did not meet the statutory requirements.

The finding was non-compliance, and the Direction required Peel to prohibit members from carrying or using the system until training was prescribed by law and completed. The province has since made changes to permit training approved by the chief of police, and the PepperBall system is now authorized for use. So, an example of a "feedback loop" that exists between my Decisions as IG, and government policy-making that can be responsive to these Decisions.

The Decision also addressed governance. Peel had not informed its Police Service Board about the procurement and deployment of the weapon.

In the Decision, I said that information about the acquisition and deployment of a new use of force option should be proactively shared with a board so that it has the visibility required to fulfil its governance role. After all, it is the board that is legally accountable for the service's operations, including potential litigation that could arise from those operations — including use of force incidents.

And I asked chiefs and boards across Ontario to take seriously the need for information to flow from day-to-day operations to police governance bodies.

So, when we talk about the delivery of adequate and effective policing, we are not talking only about the moment at which a policing service is delivered.

The Decisions are also engaging the requirements that surround it — training, procedure, supervision, quality assurance and governance.

And that brings me to the third theme.

Theme Three: Police Service Board Members Carry Distinct Statutory Duties and Obligations

The section 106 Decisions are beginning to interpret and apply the Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members to the circumstances board members encounter in carrying out their roles. And, the different outcomes are important.

The Decision involving a Port Hope Police Service Board member released on August 27, 2026 involved allegations that the board member had engaged in conduct that placed his duties as a board member in conflict with his private employment interests.

After reviewing the Findings Report, I concluded that the member had committed misconduct under the Code of Conduct. The outcome was a six-month suspension without pay for breaches of sections 21(a) and 22 of the Code. And, importantly, this Decision interpreted the conflict of interest provisions of the Code of Conduct in a way that had not occurred to date, providing broader guidance and a trail of breadcrumbs for board members across the province to follow.

A Decision involving a Gananoque Police Service Board member released on December 17, 2025 involved a different kind of issue. That Decision addressed what has sometimes been described as the “two hats” issue for municipal officials who also serve on police service boards.

There, a board member who was also the mayor disclosed confidential information obtained during closed board meetings about the police response to a gathering of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. Importantly, the information was obtained through his role as a police service board member, not through his role as mayor.

I found that he breached sections 4 and 15(1) of the Code by releasing information about policing operations without authorization.

In my Decision, I was clear that the responsibilities of mayor — or councillor — do not override the obligations that come with serving as a police service board member. In other words, mayoral or council office does not sit at the top of some kind of hierarchy of stator obligations relative to one's board member role.

Taken together, these Decisions reinforce a fairly important point about police governance. Serving on a police service board carries its own statutory duties and obligations. Those obligations do not disappear because a member also has another role — whether that is an elected municipal role or a private employment interest.

These Decisions are also beginning to provide greater clarity about how the obligations in the Code apply in practice. As additional matters are decided, that body of interpretation will continue to develop.

And, here I have some very specific words for this audience: for counsel advising boards, chiefs or individual board members, the growing body of Decisions will be increasingly important.

The Decisions are giving us greater clarity in each of those areas. They are also unpacking legal requirements in CSPA land, interpreting and applying them to different factual matrices, and, ultimately, providing legal conclusions that set precedent for the sector as a whole.

This, clearly, is where you as legal counsel to police chiefs, services, boards, and others, come in.

Now, Decisions are one significant component of my role and work.

However, if we want to understand how the policing system is performing more broadly — where pressures are developing, where strong performance exists, and whether something we are seeing in one place may reflect a broader issue — we need a wider field of view.

That is where data and research become increasingly important. The Inspectorate of Policing has now completed its first full cycle of data collection from municipal police services and boards.

We are building a policing data ecosystem, and this year launched our Intelligence Hub to make data and information more accessible and usable for police services and police service boards. This is part of a commitment we made at the beginning: that we will not simply ask and take. We will analyze, and share.

In addition, our Policing Performance Measurement Framework is being designed around a basic question that Ontario has never had a common, province-wide way of answering: How well are our police services and boards actually performing?

And, our research on police response times illustrates why consistent performance measurement matters. Everyone intuitively understands why response time matters. A person calls the police. How long does it take for help to arrive? But when we began

studying response times across Ontario, we found significant differences in how they were measured and reported.

But one of the strengths of Ontario's modernized oversight framework is that it allows us to engage not only with questions of performance, but also with some of the most challenging issues facing the policing sector. Issues that often go directly to the heart of public confidence.

The province-wide inspection into police integrity and anti-corruption practices illustrates that point.

That inspection was initiated following allegations that raised legitimate questions about the strength of existing integrity, supervision and accountability systems within Ontario's policing sector.

While those issues emerged in a particular context, the questions they raised extended beyond any single police service.

They engaged issues that affect confidence in policing more broadly. And, when issues arise that have the potential to affect confidence in the broader system, independent oversight has an important role to play.

Not only in examining the substance of those issues. But, in doing so using an approach that is independent, transparent and focused on the public interest. In many respects, public confidence is one of the foundations upon which our policing system depends.

Police services depend on it in delivering their mandate. Police service boards depend on it in exercising effective governance. And, oversight bodies depend on it in carrying out their responsibilities. We all have a role to play in maintaining the public confidence on which we all depend to do what we do.

As much as oversight is sometimes viewed as difficult, challenging or burdensome, it is also an important part of maintaining confidence in the institutions that the public relies upon.

And, when difficult issues arise that have the potential to affect confidence in the broader system, it is important that there is an independent framework capable of examining those issues, identifying what needs to change, and supporting improvement where improvement is required.

Ontario's modernized oversight framework was designed to support accountability, improve performance, and strengthen both policing and police governance. That means oversight must be capable of identifying non-compliance when it exists.

But, and equally important from a public confidence perspective, it must also be capable of recognizing strong performance when it exists. That has been part of our approach from the beginning. Our role is not simply to identify where standards are not being met.

It is also to understand what is working well and whether there are lessons that may be useful elsewhere in the province. In many respects, that is what I mean when I speak about moving “beyond compliance”.

If a police service or police service board is performing well, we should want to understand why. Increasingly, we are developing a richer understanding of policing and police governance across Ontario. Strong performance can tell us something more than whether the standard has been met. It can help show the sector how the bar can continue to be raised.

Because improving performance does not end at just meeting the compliance finish line.

I want to close on a personal note. Earlier in my career, I had the privilege of working with Justice John Morden on the review that followed the G20 Summit in Toronto.

That work was necessarily retrospective. A significant policing event had taken place, public confidence had been tested and fundamentally shaken, and we were looking back, asking difficult questions about governance, accountability and oversight, and about what needed to change.

In the years since, I have had the opportunity to work on policing policy and legislative reform, to work directly in police governance, and now, as Ontario’s first Inspector General of Policing, to apply the modernized framework that emerged from that broader evolution.

There is something very full-circle about that for me. I have seen first-hand why the ability to look back matters. Accountability requires it. We need institutions capable of examining difficult events independently, fairly, and legitimately with transparency.

But modern oversight also gives us the ability to look across the system while it is operating, to connect what we are seeing in real time; to recognize when an issue in one place may tell us something larger; and, where possible, to identify risk before it becomes a more significant problem.

We are still relatively early in the life of the CSPA. Many of you in this room will help shape how this framework develops in practice – through the advice you give, the governance decisions you support, the policies and procedures you help develop, the arguments you advance, and the way these early interpretations are applied.

Most members of the public might never read section 11, Regulation 392/23, or an Inspector General Decision. But, they will experience our legal framework in practice – through the policing they receive, the quality of the governance behind it, and the accountability they see when difficult issues arise.

And, ultimately, that is where the concept of adequate and effective policing has to have meaning.

Not simply as a legal standard we interpret or a threshold we assess, but in whether Ontario’s policing system is capable of meeting the needs of its communities.