

Decision Regarding Findings Report INV-25-177 Concerning the Conduct of Port Hope Police Service Board Member Jason Wooland

Decision By:

Ryan Teschner, Inspector General of Policing

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] This decision addresses an allegation that Jason Wooland, a member of the Port Hope Police Service Board (the “Board”), committed misconduct by repeatedly engaging in conduct that placed his duties as a board member in conflict with his private employment. This allegation was investigated by an inspector with Ontario’s Inspectorate of Policing (“IoP”) who prepared a Findings Report,¹ which is attached to this Decision as Appendix A.

[2] Following a review of the Findings Report and for the reasons that follow, I conclude that Mr. Wooland has committed misconduct in contravention of the *Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members* (“Code of Conduct”).² Specifically, he breached:

- Subsection 21(a) of the Code of Conduct: “A member of a police service board shall not use their position as a police service board member to (a) benefit themselves...”, and
- Section 22 of the Code of Conduct: “A member of a police service board shall not participate in discussion of or voting with respect to matters at police service board meetings if the member has a conflict of interest in the matter.”

II. BACKGROUND

[3] I adopt the facts as found by the Inspector and outlined in the Findings Report.

[4] Mr. Wooland is presently a member of the Board and has been since his appointment on August 29, 2024. He is also employed as the head of security for the Ontario Power Generation Inc. (“OPG”) and was at all times pertinent to these allegations.

[5] In short, Mr. Wooland is alleged to have twice requested confidential information from the Port Hope Police Service (“PHPS”), in his role as a police service board member, to assist with his work at the OPG.

¹ Section 123 of the *Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019*, SO 2019, c 1, Sch 1 (“CSPA”) requires an IoP inspector who completes an investigation of a complaint to report their findings to the Inspector General. This report is redacted to comply with the *Publication of Findings Reports and Directions under Sections 123 and 125 of the Act* Regulation, O Reg 317/24.

² Code of Conduct, O Reg 408/23, enacted under the CSPA.

[6] Furthermore, he is alleged to have improperly involved himself in OPG efforts to have the PHPS and the Board purchase firearms on behalf of OPG so as to expedite OPG's acquisition of the firearms. I do not need to determine if there were any improprieties in the OPG's proposal to the Board, and nothing in my decision should be taken as comment on the proposal. Rather, the only issue for my decision is whether Mr. Wooland used his role as a board member in a manner that violated the Code of Conduct.

III. ISSUES

[7] The issues arising in this complaint include:

1. Was Mr. Wooland in a conflict of interest when seeking to intervene in and advocate on behalf of OPG before the Board, and
2. Did his conduct constitute a breach of conflict provisions of the Code of Conduct?

IV. ANALYSIS

Conflict of Interest and the Code of Conduct

[8] Section 2 of the Code of Conduct creates a legal definition of "conflict of interest" for a police service board member:

"conflict of interest" means a situation in which a member of a police service board's private interests or personal relationships place, or may reasonably be perceived to place, the member in conflict with their duties as a member of the police service board ...

[9] Where a specific conflict of interest is identified by a board member, the Code of Conduct requires that the member promptly disclose the conflict to the chair of the board, or if the conflict of interest involves the chair, to the Inspector General. The board member must then disclose the conflict at the next meeting of the police service board.³ Thereafter, a board member "shall not participate in discussion or voting with respect to matters at police service board meetings if the member has a conflict of interest in the matter."⁴

³ Code of Conduct, section 20.

⁴ Code of Conduct, section 22.

[10] Finally, a board member must never use their position as a board member to benefit themselves; one or more persons with whom they have a personal relationship; or to interfere with the administration of justice.⁵

The Code of Conduct and the *Municipal Conflict of Interest Act*

[11] Additional guidance as to what constitutes a “conflict of interest” can be found in the *Municipal Conflict of Interest Act* (“MCIA”).⁶ Police service boards are “local boards” as defined in that Act.⁷ Accordingly, members of a police service board are also members of a “local board,” and so are concurrently subject to the MCIA’s conflict provisions. Section 5 of the MCIA requires that:

5 (1) Where a member, either on his or her own behalf or while acting for, by, with or through another, has any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any matter and is present at a meeting of the council or local board at which the matter is the subject of consideration, the member,

(a) shall, prior to any consideration of the matter at the meeting, disclose the interest and the general nature thereof;

(b) shall not take part in the discussion of, or vote on any question in respect of the matter; and

(c) shall not attempt in any way whether before, during or after the meeting to influence the voting on any such question.

[emphasis added]

[12] The concept of “indirect pecuniary interest” is relevant in this matter. While the Code of Conduct does not itself define this term, the MCIA does. An “indirect pecuniary interest” arises where a member “is in the employment of a person or body that has a pecuniary interest in the matter.”⁸ Mr. Wooland, as head of the OPG security division, was an employee of the corporation, which obviously had a pecuniary interest in the purchase of firearms by the Board for the corporation.

⁵ Code of Conduct, section 21.

⁶ *Municipal Conflict of Interest Act*, RSO 1990, c M.50 (“MCIA”).

⁷ Section 1, MCIA.

⁸ Subsection 2(b), MCIA.

Application of the Conflict-of-Interest Provisions

[13] It is undisputed that on April 24, 2025, Mr. Wooland tabled the original motion for the Board to consider the firearms acquisition for eventual transfer to OPG. This itself is problematic. Mr. Wooland was in a conflict in relation to the matter the motion concerned, and should not have introduced it nor participated in any discussion or voting on it. Unfortunately, the Board did not appear to appreciate the conflict at the time.

[14] Moreover, at the Board's September 25, 2025 meeting, Mr. Wooland proceeded to address the issue despite having by this point declared a conflict of interest on the issue. It was only the intervention of the IoP Advisor that stopped Mr. Wooland from speaking and, ultimately led to him leaving the meeting, as required.

[15] Seemingly undeterred, Mr. Wooland raised the issue of the firearms acquisition request yet again with senior members of the PHPS and another Board member following a tour of the proposed OPG site in Port Hope by the group on October 24, 2025. There, Mr. Wooland openly canvassed the possibility of a six-percent administrative fee to be paid by OPG as compensation for the Board's efforts in procuring and transferring the firearms to OPG. Mr. Wooland initiated this discussion despite having previously declared a conflict on this matter with the Board, and despite having been expressly informed by a representative of the IoP that he could not engage on the issue further with the Board.

[16] Lastly, but continuing this conduct, on October 28, 2025, Mr. Wooland emailed the Board Chair requesting a response to OPG's firearms request, and inviting them to contact him with any questions or concerns.

[17] Mr. Wooland's employment with OPG is the private interest at issue in this case. Mr. Wooland was clearly approaching the firearms acquisition request as a representative of OPG – but, also in his capacity as a board member, bringing a motion on the initial request forward to the Board in April 2025, and then continuing to repeatedly raise the matter with the Board thereafter.

[18] Mr. Wooland suggests that the request he was attempting to move forward would, if agreed to, not have resulted in any private benefit to him. But that is not the test under the Code of Conduct. Rather, the test is whether Mr. Wooland was placed, or would be seen by a reasonable person to be placed, in a conflict with his duties as a member of the Board because he was advancing matters related to his private interest (that is, his employment) in his capacity as a Board member.

[19] Once a matter – here, the firearms acquisition request – was linked both to the Board and OPG, Mr. Wooland seemed unable to distinguish between his two distinct roles. Instead, they merged in his mind, and he operated as if they were one and the same because, in his mind, he saw mutual benefits for both the Board and OPG. Of course, a conflict of interest is not resolved by the existence of a mutual benefit for both parties that are related to the conflict. In fact, the existence of a mutual benefit may well be a strong indicator that a conflict exists.

[20] In my view, the Code of Conduct's conflict of interest test is met: Mr. Wooland, as an employee of the OPG, would be seen by a reasonable person as conflicted in his ability to, without favour, participate in or make decisions as a board member about the firearms acquisition request before the Board. Put another way, a reasonable person could fairly be concerned that Mr. Wooland might give priority to the OPG's corporate interests, as well as to his own employment interests, over those of the Board and the PHPS. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Wooland violated section 22 of the Code of Conduct.

[21] I also believe that Mr. Wooland's private interests in this case included his interest in being seen to achieve a favourable outcome for his employer. This is the type of "indirect pecuniary interest" referenced by the MCIA. Whether that would result in any tangible benefit to Mr. Wooland is not known on this record. Regardless, being celebrated as a valuable employee who achieved a favourable outcome would certainly be a personal benefit to Mr. Wooland. As a result, I also find that Mr. Wooland violated subsection 21(a) of the Code of Conduct.

V. MEASURES

[22] Having concluded that Mr. Wooland committed misconduct under the Code of Conduct, I am obliged to consider the imposition of an appropriate measure under the CSPA. I may "reprimand the board member; suspend the board member for a specified period of time or until the member has complied with specified conditions; or remove the member from the board."⁹

⁹ Subsection 124(1), Act.

[23] Ontario has had in place a legislative oversight mechanism governing the conduct of police service board members for more than thirty years, and is one of only three provinces with one.¹⁰ Nonetheless, there is a paucity of available jurisprudence to assist in determining an appropriate measure for misconduct of police service board members.¹¹ Accordingly, I must turn to other juridical and academic sources for assistance in crafting guiding principles.

[24] In deciding upon the appropriateness of any measure, I am guided by principles that are common to the determination of appropriate conduct measures in other professional regimes. That said, the duties and obligations of a police service board member are necessarily tied to the police legislation that establishes police service boards and the police services for which they are responsible. Consequently, I am of the view that examining the principles that guide the determination of conduct measures for the police officers that board members govern constitutes a good starting point.

The Foundational Principles

[25] Despite differing conduct and discipline processes among Canadian jurisdictions, the evolution of the jurisprudence has developed a number of general principles that serve as the foundation for crafting a fit disciplinary conduct measure for police officers. They have been described as follows:

- The measure must fully accord with the purposes of police discipline including the higher conduct standard applicable to the constabulary;
- A presumption of imposing the least onerous measure, and that corrective measures should prevail, where possible; and,
- Proportionality.¹²

¹⁰ See Nova Scotia's *Police Act*, SNS 2004 c 31, *Police Regulations*, NS Reg 230/2005, s 79; and very recently, British Columbia's *Police Act*, RSBC 1996, c 367, *Municipal Police Board Member Code of Conduct Regulation*, BC Reg 113/2025.

¹¹The most relevant decisions of the former Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services addressing misconduct allegations concerning board members were varied or quashed upon judicial review. See *Re Gardner*, 2004 CanLII 2540 (Ont Div Ct), leave to appeal denied, (*sub nom Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services et al v Norman Gardner*), 2004 CarswellOnt 4945 (Docket CA M31564)(CA), wherein the Divisional Court ordered a re-hearing by the Commission, which was never held as Mr. Gardner resigned; and *Mayor Daryl Bennett v Ontario Civilian Police Commission*, unreported, December 8th, 2016 (Court File No DC 15-813), varying, *Re Bennett*, 2015 ONCPC 10, wherein the parties reached a settlement that prescribed, without reasons, that 10 of the 12 original conduct findings be vacated and Mayor Bennett's removal order varied to a 12-month suspension.

¹² See P Ceyssens, *Legal Aspects of Policing* (Saltspring Island: Earls court Legal Press, 1994) (loose leaf updated 2025) at §5.10(a). There, the author delineates the same principles as "five foundational principles", breaking out the constituent elements in principles 1 & 2. See also, Canada, "*Phase 1 - Final Report Concerning Conduct Measures, and the Application of Conduct Measures to Sex-Related Misconduct Under*

[26] I will examine each of the principles as they apply to a police service board member, with the necessary modifications.

1st Principle: Purposes of Police Service Board Member Discipline and a Higher Conduct Standard

[27] Based on the Act and regulations, four purposes of police service board member discipline can be summarized as follows:

- Ensuring the public interest is served by maintaining a high standard of conduct by the board and its members, and public confidence in the board's ability to govern the police service. This is, arguably, the most important of the purposes;
- The board's dual interest in maintaining a properly functioning board while still ensuring board members can meaningfully participate in their governance function;
- The rights of a respondent board member to be treated fairly when alleged to have committed misconduct; and
- Ensures the interests of individual members of the public are protected where they are involved in the process.

[28] Balancing these interests is the primary goal of the first principle. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently observed, "[t]he purposes of disciplinary bodies are to protect the public, to regulate the profession and to preserve public confidence in the profession ..."¹³

[29] Similarly, the Supreme Court discussed the purposes of the complaint and discipline process in relation to the presumptive dismissal of a Quebec police officer under their respective legislation:

...it is a decision that requires the balancing of competing interests of the police officer facing dismissal, the municipality, both as an employer and as a public body responsible for the security of the public, and of the community as a whole in maintaining respect and confidence in its police officers.¹⁴

Part IV of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act" (February 24, 2022) at p 13 onward: <[phase-1-final-report-rcmps-conduct-measures-guide.pdf](#)>

¹³ *Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz*, 2022 SCC 29 at paras 53, 93.

¹⁴ *Lévis (City) v Fraternité des policiers de Lévis*, 2007 SCC 14 at para 24.

[30] Moreover, Canadian appellate courts have consistently held police officers to a higher conduct expectation than other types of employees or members of the public, and this higher conduct expectation extends into off-duty conduct.¹⁵

[31] The (now dissolved) Ontario Civilian Police Commission (the “Commission”) has held that the standard of conduct imposed on board members is greater than that to which police officers are held.¹⁶ In describing the standard of behaviour expected of police service board members and board chairs, the Commission observed that:

As public stewards charged with the responsibility of ensuring that police forces are accountable to the communities they serve, police services board members are subject to the highest standard of conduct possible under the statutory scheme of the Act. In *Gardner* ... the Commission held that the standard of conduct imposed on board members is greater than that to which members of a police service are held.¹⁷ [emphasis added]

[32] Accordingly, board members bear “... a significant and unqualified commitment imposing on [them] a responsibility to conduct themselves with the utmost circumspection and prudence and the highest levels of honesty and integrity.”¹⁸

[33] The Commission has also specifically addressed the limits placed on board members by the predecessor Code of Conduct:

PSB members are responsible for the careful and responsible management of a police service which deals with the public’s liberty and safety. Members must understand that to be a public steward, is to first and foremost serve the public, not one’s own self-interests. This requires limits at times to one’s behaviour, as is provided in the Code of Conduct.¹⁹

¹⁵ *Attorney General Canada v Muller* 2022 FCA 99 at para 15; *R v Theriault*, 2021 ONCA 517 at paras 206-207; *R v Forcillo* 2018 ONCA 402, leave to appeal refused, [2018] SCCA No. 258, at paras 198-199. See also, *Montréal (City) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)*, 2008 SCC 48 at para 33; *Quaidoo v Edmonton Police Service*, 2015 ABCA at para 51; *Campbell v The Police Chief*, et al, 2016 NBQB 225 at paras 19-22, aff’d 2018 NBCA 54; 2019 CanLII 18833, leave to appeal to SCC refused; *Edmonton Police Service v Furlong*, 2013 ABCA 121 at para 37.

¹⁶ *Stirling-Rawdon (Police Service) v Oliver*, 2014 ONCPC 2502 at para 616; *Re Gardner*, 2004 Carswell 5000, March 1, 2004 (OCCPS) at para 195, rev’d on other grounds, *sub nom Gardner v. Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services*, 2004 CanLII 2540 (Ont Div Ct).

¹⁷ *Oliver*, note **Error! Bookmark not defined.** at para 616.

¹⁸ *Gardner*, note **Error! Bookmark not defined.** at para 197. See also *In the Matter of Hearing Under Section 25 of the Police Services Act into the Conduct and Performance of Duties of the Members of the Wallaceburg Police Services Board*, June 1996, Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services.

¹⁹ *Bennett (Re)*, 2014 ONCPC 250 at para 52, referencing the previous *Members of Police Services Boards – Code of Conduct*, O Reg 421/97.

2nd Principle: Presumption of Least Onerous Measure and Corrective Measures Should Prevail, Where Possible

[34] The presumption of imposing the least onerous measure that proves appropriate accords with employment and labour law practices.

[35] This presumption is also embedded in section 124(3) of the Act, which permits (but does not require) the Inspector General to impose a proposed measure, a lesser measure or rescind his or her intention to implement any measure following submissions by a respondent board member.²⁰

[36] The presumption toward imposing corrective measures, where possible, reflects an evolution toward a more remedial philosophy in the police complaint and discipline process. This approach originated in the 1976 *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints, Internal Discipline and Grievance Procedure Within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police* (the “Marin Report”).²¹ The Marin Report observed that not all problems giving rise to misconduct can be corrected through the use of punishment. Some problems of performance or conduct resulted from circumstances over which the individual had no control. Even where the individual was the source of the problem, some problems resulted from inadequate training, personality clashes or a lack of familiarization with local conditions or a new environment. Accurate identification of the source of a difficulty was necessary to decide when punishment was appropriate.²²

[37] Nevertheless, circumstances certainly exist where the least onerous measure, much less a corrective measure, are not appropriate. In police discipline, recent examples include the dismissal at first instance of a police officer whose “egregious” misconduct involved intentional and repeated lying under oath and the officer was no longer fit for service;²³ and, the similar dismissal of a police officer who was found guilty of theft and attempting to use her position as a police officer for personal gain.²⁴

²⁰ Note that subsection 126 the Act does impose consideration of a “least onerous” measure or direction when determining how best to correct a failure to comply with a prior direction of the Inspector General by a police service board, O.P.P. detachment board, First Nation O.P.P. board, chief of police, special constable employer, police service or prescribed policing provider.

²¹ Canada, *The Report of the Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints, Internal Discipline and Grievance Procedure Within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976).

²² The Marin Report, at pp 134-135.

²³ *Toy v Edmonton Police Service*, 2018 ABCA 37 (“Toy”).

²⁴ *Campbell v Fredericton Police Force*, 2018 NBCA 45.

3rd Principle: Proportionality

[38] Proportionality is the most complex of the foundational principles governing the determination of an appropriate measure. It requires an administrative decision-maker to:

- i. Identify the relevant considerations in the circumstances;
- ii. Assess each relevant consideration as mitigating, aggravating or neutral in the circumstances; and
- iii. Balance or weigh the various considerations with the factual background of the matter and the four purposes of the board member complaint and discipline process.²⁵

[39] Examples of proportionality factors include public interest, seriousness of the misconduct, recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct (*i.e.* remorse); disability or other relevant personal circumstances; provocation; procedural fairness considerations; appointment history; conduct history; potential to reform or rehabilitate the board member; parity of measure; specific and general deterrence; organizational or institutional context; damage to the reputation of the police service board; effect of publicity; and impact on the police service board's ability to govern.²⁶ Not all considerations will be relevant in each case, and so, those that are relevant must be identified and applied in the context of the proportionality analysis.

Application to this Case

[40] In deciding upon the appropriateness of any measure, the foundational principles framework I outlined, above, requires me to consider more than the board member's conduct itself. Context always matters, and it matters here.

²⁵ See Toy, note 23 at para 56; *Constable A v Edmonton Police Service*, 2017 ABCA 38 at para 60; *Favretto v Ontario Provincial Police*, 2004 CanLII 34173 at para 37 (ON CA), leave to appeal refused, [2005] 1 SCR xiii; and *Quinte West Police Service v Blakely*, [2007] OJ 3109 at para 14 (Div Ct).

²⁶ Variations on this list of proportionality factors have been used widely by police review boards, adjudicators, courts and legislation in the police discipline context. For examples, see *Furlong v Edmonton Police Service*, 2013 ABCA 121 at para 27; *Bishop v Gilbert*, 2012 CanLII 100594 (NSPRB) at para 9; *Reeves and London Police*, 2021 ONCPC 3 at paras 11-12; *Saint John Police and Messer*, [2013] NBLAA 9 at para 115 (QL); and *Harris v Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission* 2017 CanLII 46340 at para 110. British Columbia requires decision-makers to consider a specific list of factors in its police legislation: *Police Act*, RSBC 1996, c 367, s 126(2).

[41] Fairness requires that I consider the broader context in which the misconduct occurred. A non-exhaustive list of factors that might inform the broader context could include the board member's prior professional experience; any relevant training received as a board member; whether the board member was made aware of the potential of a conflict and had an opportunity to address it appropriately; personal circumstances of the board member at the time of the misconduct; the motivations behind the board member's misconduct; and, the risk factors for the board and police service flowing from the board member's misconduct. The CSPA also permits board members whom I have found to have committed misconduct to make submissions to me as to the measure I propose.²⁷

[42] On July 24, 2026, the Inspectorate of Policing notified Mr. Wooland that, upon my review of the Findings Report, I had determined that it disclosed evidence that he had committed misconduct. Mr. Wooland was furnished with a copy of the Findings Report, a copy of the applicable provisions from the Code of Conduct, and a letter outlining my proposed measure (*i.e.*, six-month suspension without pay) as well as a list of common law principles that I had considered and that he might choose to address in his submissions on the proposed measure. On August 13, 2026, Mr. Wooland provided his submissions to me.

[43] In his submissions, Mr. Wooland focuses on contesting my finding that there was evidence that he had committed misconduct. Specifically, he argues that:

- there was no evidence of personal benefit by virtue of engaging in discussions about the procurement for firearms;
- he was not notified in writing by the PHPS of the conflict, but that he was advised verbally of a potential conflict;
- there was no evidence of participating in the matter following the identification of the potential conflict; and,
- asking about the status of the matter of the procurement is "not a breach of conflict-of-interest boundaries".

²⁷ Section 124(2) of the Act.

[44] In considering these submissions, I continue to be concerned that Mr. Wooland does not appreciate how conflict of interest principles operate or are applied in this context through the Code of Conduct. Based on my interpretation of the Code of Conduct, Mr. Wooland was clearly “over the line”, and continued to stray “over that line” even after (based on his own admissions) he was alerted to the potential conflict. Despite this, Mr. Wooland persisted, continuing to ask for information to which he was not entitled and should not have sought. Moreover, Mr. Wooland seems to place responsibility for being notified of the conflict at the feet of the police service for which he (as part of the Board) is responsible for governing.

[45] This is simply backwards. Those that govern retain responsibility for complying with applicable conduct rules. That responsibility was Mr. Wooland’s alone. Additionally, despite being alerted to the potential conflict by the IoP Advisor, Mr. Wooland persisted in this course of conduct. His argument falls flat. Responsibility for monitoring or alerting board members of potential conflict never lies with the police service with which board members are charged to oversee.

[46] Finally, in respect of the proposed measure, Mr. Wooland asserts that his “time served” under suspension is the appropriate measure. (Mr. Wooland refers to the time during which he has been directed to refrain from engaging in his role as a board member, pursuant to section 122 of the Act.)

[47] In applying the operative principles to this matter, and having taken Mr. Wooland’s submissions into account, I remain of the view that the appropriate measure to impose is a six-month suspension, without pay.

[48] I begin by reiterating the first principle: that members of police service boards are expected to operate as public stewards, of whom the highest level of conduct is demanded. The Code of Conduct enshrines this, and through it, specifically calls out the need to engage in board member duties in a manner that does not give rise to a conflict of interest. Board members are empowered to participate in decisions of significance, including what entities the police service does business with and the terms of those business arrangements. These decisions must be made without favour. Mr. Wooland’s conduct here is not aligned with this first principle, and the measure must reflect his conduct’s gravity in terms of public trust.

[49] I also recognize that Mr. Wooland has effectively been suspended during the life of this investigation, which has spanned approximately 10 months. I appreciate that this is a long time. However, during this time, Mr. Wooland does not appear to have improved his understanding of the conduct rules by which he must abide.

[50] This is a significant consideration. The principle that corrective measures should prevail, where possible, is in part dependent on the board member's ability to demonstrate that they have an understanding that the impugned conduct was problematic. As his submissions make clear, I do not believe that this is the case here.

[51] In terms of the proportionality principle, there are several factors that are more germane to my decision in terms of remedy. Mr. Wooland completed the mandatory training that all police service board members in Ontario are required to complete. This training includes information about the Code of Conduct, and the conflict-of-interest provisions specifically. In addition, Mr. Wooland is an executive in the corporate world, where being aware of conflicts of interest and taking steps to minimize them are part of that world, too. Lastly, Mr. Wooland was advised in "real time" of the likely existence of a conflict of interest, and his obligations under the Code of Conduct that flowed from this conflict. Nonetheless, Mr. Wooland persisted to seek to have the firearms acquisition secured on several occasions subsequent to that advice.

[52] Overall, what concerns me about Mr. Wooland's conduct is less his specific actions, and more, his view that even in the face of specific training, advice from the IoP representative, and with the benefit of hindsight, Mr. Wooland still seems not to view his conduct as problematic. He eventually saw his conflict obligations as requiring him to refrain from Board decision-making on the matter, but not as an overall limitation from all discussions on the matter. I accept his view as being genuinely held, but there is no "good faith" exemption for the conflict provisions of the Code of Conduct.

[53] Section 22 of the Code of Conduct is clear: “A member of a police service board shall not participate in discussion of or voting with respect to matters at police service board meetings if the member has a conflict of interest in the matter” [emphasis added]. I do not see the prohibition against discussion of a matter as limited to the actual discussions at board meetings. Once there is a conflict – that is, that an individual has an interest motivating them other than the proper discharge of their statutory role as a board member – then even seeking to influence through discussion the rest of the board is seeking to do indirectly what you cannot do directly. Subsection 5(1)(a) of the MCIA supports this interpretation by specifying that a board member with a conflict “shall not attempt in any way whether before, during or after the meeting to influence the voting on any such question” [emphasis added].

[54] Mr. Wooland should have simply advised his employer and the Board of the conflict at the outset, and taken steps to not participate or seek to influence the decision in any way. The OPG and the Board would then have been left to work through the matter without Mr. Wooland’s involvement.

[55] In addition, the Chair of the Board should have engaged in earlier discussions with Mr. Wooland as soon as the item was first raised, back in April 2025. At that time, the conflict of interest should have been identified, properly documented and put on the record at the first available opportunity. The Board should have then taken steps to ensure that the safeguards that needed to be in place to ensure no conflict contaminated the decision-making process were adhered to.

VI. CONCLUSION

[56] I remain satisfied that the appropriate measure in this matter is to suspend Mr. Wooland from his duties as a member of the Board for a period of six months, without pay.

Date: August 27, 2026

Original Signed By

Ryan Teschner
Inspector General of Policing

FINDINGS REPORT

Port Hope Police Service Board
Member: Jason Wooland

**Section 106(1) Board Member
Conduct Investigation**
(INV-25-177)

Submitted to:
Ryan Teschner
Inspector General of Policing of
Ontario

July 24, 2026

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ABOUT THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICING AND THE INSPECTORATE OF POLICING

The Inspector General of Policing drives improved performance and accountability in policing and police governance by overseeing the delivery of adequate and effective policing across Ontario. The Inspector General ensures compliance with the province's policing legislation and standards, and has the authority to issue progressive, risk-based and binding directions and measures to protect public safety. Ontario's Community Safety and Policing Act embeds protections to ensure the Inspector General's statutory duty is delivered independently from government.

The Inspector General of Policing leads the Inspectorate of Policing (IoP). The IoP provides operational support to inspect, investigate, monitor, and advise Ontario's police services, boards and special constable employers. By leveraging independent research and data intelligence, the IoP promotes leading practices and identifies areas for improvement, ensuring that high-quality policing and police governance is delivered to make everyone in Ontario safer.

In March 2023, Ryan Teschner was appointed as Ontario's first Inspector General of Policing with duties and authorities under the Community Safety and Policing Act. Mr. Teschner is a recognized expert in public administration, policing and police governance.

For more information about the Inspector General of Policing or the IoP, please visit www.iopontario.ca.

INTRODUCTION

This is a report to the Inspector General of Policing by an inspector appointed by the Inspector General, who has completed an investigation under Part VII of the [Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019](#) (CSPA).

OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATION

The Complaint

The investigation was initiated pursuant to section 111(2) of the CSPA to address allegations that Jason Wooland, a member of the PHPSB, contravened the Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members.

On two occasions Mr. Wooland was allegedly observed requesting information from the Port Hope Police Service (PHPS) to assist with their work at Ontario Power Generation (OPG), rather than for board-related purposes. These concerns were raised with the Chair of the PHPSB, who indicated they would address the matter directly with Mr. Wooland.

A second instance occurred at the PHPSB meeting on September 25, 2025, during discussion of a potential firearms purchase by the PHPS for transfer to OPG. The Board identified that Mr. Wooland was in a conflict of interest on this matter. During the closed session, Mr. Wooland attempted to introduce the request on behalf of OPG. Mr. Wooland was informed that he could not participate in any discussion or vote. Mr. Wooland then exited the meeting.

After Mr. Wooland was instructed to discontinue any involvement in OPG's request to obtain firearms from the PHPS, another incident allegedly occurred on October 24, 2025, when the PHPS attended a scheduled tour of OPG with several senior members of the Service and a Board member. At the conclusion of the tour, Mr. Wooland approached the group and stated the need to speak with them about the firearms acquisition, characterized the matter as urgent, indicated that OPG would add a six percent administrative fee, noted that another vendor was available but preferred the PHPS to receive the funds, and urged the Board to convene an ad hoc meeting.

Additionally, on October 28, 2025, Mr. Wooland emailed the Chair and the Board requesting a response to OPG's firearms request and invited them to reach out with any questions or for further information.

The Subject Police Service Board Member

Name of Police Service Board: Port Hope Police Service Board

Subject Board Member: Jason Wooland

Length of service (Term): Appointed August 29, 2024

Specific Roles Held on Police Service Board: Board Member

Previous Substantiated Misconduct: None

Appointing Authority: Province

Applicable Legislative and Regulatory Provisions

Section 35(6) of the CSPA provides that every member of a police service board shall comply with the prescribed code of conduct.

[Ontario Regulation 408/23: Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members](#) was reviewed having regard to the allegations made in the complaint and the following sections were deemed to be relevant:

- a) Section 3 (1), A member of a police service board shall not conduct themselves in a manner that undermines or is likely to undermine the public's trust in the police service board or the police service maintained by the police service board.
- b) Section 4, A member of a police service board shall comply with the Act and the regulations made under it.
- c) Section 6, A member of a police service board shall comply with any rules, procedures and by-laws of the police service board.
- d) Section 20(1), A member of a police service board shall promptly disclose any conflict of interest,
 - (a) to the chair of the board.
 - (2) After making the disclosure required by subsection (1), the member shall disclose the conflict at the next meeting of the police service board.
- e) Section 21, A member of a police service board shall not use their position as a police service board member to,
 - (a) benefit themselves;
 - (b) benefit one or more persons with whom they have a personal relationship;
- f) Section 22, A member of a police service board shall not participate in discussion of or voting with respect to matters at police service board meetings if the member has a conflict of interest in the matter.

SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED

As part of the investigation process, interviews were conducted with the Police Service Advisor (PSA), witnesses and the subject, Jason Wooland. Additionally, Open-Source media, along with information provided by the PHPSB was reviewed and assisted with this investigation.

Information from the PHPSB

April 24, 2025, PHPSB minutes.

Under *New and Other Business*, item 9.3 addressed a *Discussion on Weapons Acquisition by OPG*, introduced by Jason Wooland.

A motion was put forward stating that the Port Hope Police Service Board was open to considering a request from Ontario Power Generation (OPG) to explore the legal and regulatory framework related to weapons procurement. The motion required OPG to undertake the necessary research and provide a detailed report for the Board's review. It also stated that the PHPSB would consult its legal counsel before making any determinations.

The motion was approved.

Summary of OPG Letter: Request for Approval – Acquisition of Glock Sidearms on Behalf of Ontario Power Generation

On September 4, 2025, the PHPSB received an email from Mr. Wooland's assistant titled "*Submission of Request for Approval.*" The email was addressed to the Chair and members of the Board, and the assistant wrote on behalf of Jason Wooland, Director of Security Operations at OPG, to submit the attached "Request for Approval" letter regarding the proposed acquisition of firearms. The attached letter requested that the PHPS acquire Glock sidearms from Rampart Corporation for subsequent transfer to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to support OPG and CNSC operational needs and ensure interoperability with the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) during joint emergency responses. The letter explained that due to federal procurement constraints, OPG was seeking to use PHPS as the purchasing entity through an established compliant process. OPG committed to fully reimbursing the PHPS for all administrative fees and costs, stating that the PHPS would be made whole, and that all reimbursements would be processed transparently with documentation suitable for audit purposes. The letter also noted that OPG's legal counsel would work with the PHPS to

ensure all statutory, regulatory, and documentation requirements were met. The letter advised that the Vice President, Security and Emergency Services, could be contacted directly with any questions and was signed by the Vice President.

September 25, 2025 - In Camera Minutes

During this meeting, Member Jason Wooland declared a conflict of interest on item 8.3, titled *OPG Request re: Firearms Acquisition*. It's noted that he left the meeting for the duration of that item.

Summary of October 28, 2025, Email from Mr. Wooland

Mr. Wooland followed up with the Chair and members of the PHPSB regarding OPG's formal request for the PHPS to acquire Glock sidearms on OPG's behalf. He asked to be advised of the Board's decision and indicated that he could provide any additional information needed to support their deliberations. He stated that OPG remained committed to working with the Board and the PHPS to ensure all legal, regulatory, and financial requirements were met.

Summary of October 31, 2025, letter from the Chair of the PHPSB

The Chair reported to the Police Service Advisor that, based on information that had been reported to the Chair and confirmed by the Board Member who attended the tour, it had been conveyed that during the October 24, 2025 tour of the OPG facility, which was attended by senior PHPS staff and one Board Member other than Mr. Wooland, Mr. Wooland raised the weapons acquisition matter at the end of the tour despite having been advised not to engage due to a known conflict of interest. The information relayed to the Chair indicated that Mr. Wooland described the matter as urgent, told the Director of Finance that OPG would offer a six percent administrative fee, suggested that another police service could proceed with the arrangement but that he preferred PHPS to receive the benefit, and proposed convening an ad hoc Board meeting so he could "make his sales pitch."

The Chair also noted that Mr. Wooland attempted to advance the matter again by email on October 28, 2025.

Summary of November 3, 2025, Email from the Board Member

The Board Member emailed the Chair on November 3, 2025, as a follow up to a prior conversation with the Chair about the events that occurred during the October 24, 2025, OPG tour. The Board Member confirmed attending the tour with PHPS representatives, including the Chief of Police, an Inspector, a Staff Sergeant, the Director of Finance, and the Executive Assistant. The Board Member reported that at the end of the tour, Mr. Wooland raised OPG's interest in purchasing firearms through the PHPS and indicated that he hoped the Board could meet during the week of October 27 to discuss the proposal. The Board Member stated that Mr. Wooland noted another police service could complete the transaction if the PHPSB chose not to proceed but expressed a preference for the PHPS to handle it. The Board Member believed he was implying a potential financial benefit for the PHPS and noted that he was concerned about delays and eager to advance the transaction.

Port Hope Police Service Board Policy GP-002 - Code of Conduct for Board Members

The policy, issued on November 28, 2024, requires Board Members to familiarize themselves with and comply with Ontario Regulation 408/23, Code of Conduct for Police Service Board Members, as well as the Policy itself. The policy sets out the sections of the Code of Conduct that apply to Board Members.

Police Service Advisor Interview

The PSA stated that during a PHPSB meeting, while the Board was discussing the relocation of a violent offender in the Port Hope area, Mr. Wooland asked the PHPS for information about the individual so he could run it through the OPG database where he worked. The information was not provided, and the PSA viewed the request as inappropriate. In a second instance, Mr. Wooland asked about the types of misconduct that occurred within the PHPS, and the penalties issued, and the PSA understood that he intended to use that information to assist with discipline responsibilities at OPG. The PSA again felt this was inappropriate.

The PSA raised these concerns with the Board Chair at the end of the June 2025 meeting and outlined three options for addressing the issue: the Chair could speak directly with Mr. Wooland, the PSA could provide a general reminder to the full Board about conflict of interest requirements so the messaging was consistent and not directed at any one individual, or the PSA could speak with Mr. Wooland personally. The Chair chose to address the matter directly by speaking with Mr. Wooland. The Chair did not follow up with the PSA afterwards, but when the PSA later inquired, the Chair confirmed that the conversation had occurred.

On September 25, 2025, the PSA attended the PHPSB meeting virtually, aware that the firearms acquisition would be discussed. The PHPSB identified that Mr. Wooland was in a conflict of interest. During the in-camera meeting, the firearms acquisition was raised almost immediately, and Mr. Wooland began to introduce the document. The PSA intervened and advised the Chair that the conflict of interest had already been identified, and that Mr. Wooland was not permitted to take part in any discussion or vote and was to not be involved in the matter. The PSA stated that the Board accepted this advice, and Mr. Wooland left the meeting and did not return. The Board continued its discussions without him. The PSA indicated that it had been made clear that Mr. Wooland could not participate in any discussions relating to OPG.

The PSA asked the Board to consider whether the proposed course of action would impact the adequacy and effectiveness of policing, and if not, why should it be pursued. The PSA also questioned why PHPS would be asked to acquire the firearms instead of a service such as the DRPS, given OPG's location within Durham Region. They further raised concerns about how it would appear for the Board to obtain firearms for OPG, given they have a Board Member employed with OPG. The PSA stated that they identified these potential risks and strongly recommended that the PHPSB obtain legal advice.

The PSA understood that OPG had approached the PHPS because it was experiencing challenges with federal procurement rules. They further understood that the PHPS Chief contacted a member of the RCMP and was advised that this type of request was not uncommon.

On October 24, 2025, the PSA was notified of an incident during an OPG tour attended by the PHPS members and one PHPSB member. They understood that Mr. Wooland did not schedule or coordinate the tour. However, at the end of the tour, he met the group and raised the potential firearms acquisition, used what was described as a high-pressure sales tactic, and referenced a six percent administration fee that would return to the PHPS. Those present reportedly felt uncomfortable.

The PSA was also notified that on October 28, 2025, Mr. Wooland sent a message to the Chair and members of the Board following up on the firearms acquisition, indicating that he looked forward to a response and that they could contact him directly if there were any questions.

Witness Interviews

Interview of PHPSB Chair

During a Board meeting where members were briefed about a violent offender relocating to the area, Mr. Wooland offered his expertise and resources based on OPG's higher level of security screening. The Chair believed he was attempting to assist the PHPS and did not recall him requesting any discipline related information.

After the June 2025 PHPSB meeting, the Police Service Advisor pulled the Chair aside and expressed concerns that Mr. Wooland was intertwining his OPG role too closely with his Board responsibilities. The Chair stated they contacted Mr. Wooland before the July meeting to address these concerns and emphasize the need for clearer separation between his OPG role and his Board duties. This conversation was not documented.

The Chair recalled that OPG related discussions were first introduced at a PHPSB meeting when Mr. Wooland explained that OPG intended to partner with a smaller service to fast track weapons acquisitions due to federal procurement delays, and that a formal request letter would follow. Although the Chair was aware of a potential conflict of interest, no formal concern was raised at that time. The Chair viewed the discussion as part of building a cooperative relationship with OPG and did not expect Mr. Wooland to present the formal request himself.

With OPG's newly announced nuclear expansion near Port Hope, there were discussions between Mr. Wooland and senior PHPS officers about the weapons held by the PHPS and OPG, as well as information sharing, educational opportunities, and collaboration efforts in anticipation of future policing needs.

During the September 25, 2025, in camera meeting, the firearms proposal was discussed. Mr. Wooland began to elaborate on the letter sent by OPG, and the Police Service Advisor, attending virtually, intervened and advised that this was a conflict of interest and directed him not to contribute further. Mr. Wooland then excused himself. The Chair stated this was the first conflict of interest issue during their time on the PHPSB and acknowledged that allowing him to speak initially was likely an oversight, as they had assumed another OPG representative would present the proposal.

The firearms acquisition proposal was new to the PHPSB, and Mr. Wooland indicated that similar arrangements occurred elsewhere in Canada. The Chair stated that the Chief confirmed this after speaking with contacts. Legal counsel was consulted after the September meeting to ensure proper protocols were being followed.

A few days after the October 24, 2025, OPG tour, the Chair learned of the incident, spoke with the Board Member who attended, obtained a statement, and drafted a letter that was sent to the Police Service Advisor. The Chair confirmed that Mr. Wooland sent an email on October 28, 2025, following up on the firearms acquisition. The matter had been scheduled for the October 2025 meeting but was deferred to November due to lack of quorum. The Chair understood the inquiry to relate primarily to the timing of the next meeting.

The Chair advised that the firearms acquisition has since been cancelled and that the PHPSB will not proceed. Mr. Wooland indicated he would pursue a different avenue through OPG. The Chair stated that Mr. Wooland was largely acting in his OPG role regarding the firearms matter and acknowledged that the proposal should have been presented by another OPG representative. Despite this, the Chair believed that Mr. Wooland's intentions were good.

Interview of PHPSB Executive Assistant (EA)

Mr. Wooland originally applied to the PHPSB as a municipal appointee but was not considered because the selection committee, which included the EA, felt he already had an existing relationship with the PHPS through OPG and that appointing him would create dual relationships with the Service.

The EA recalled an incident where, during a PHPSB discussion about a violent offender, Mr. Wooland asked whether OPG should be aware, requested the individual's name, and stated that OPG could run its own background checks. The EA noted that he often approached matters from an OPG perspective and frequently suggested sharing notes and procedures between OPG and the PHPS.

The Police Service Advisor later asked the Chair and the EA to remain after a meeting and advised the Chair that conflicts were arising and that the Chair needed to speak with Mr. Wooland about the appropriateness of his actions. The EA recalled asking the Chair on one or two occasions whether that conversation had taken place, and the Chair responded that they were waiting for the right opportunity.

The EA also noted that Mr. Wooland frequently attempted to have the PHPSB hire his partner. When the EA raised the need for a contract specialist to review the collective agreement, Mr. Wooland offered to have his partner complete the review.

The firearms acquisition was first raised at the April 24, 2025, PHPSB meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Wooland expressed frustration with federal requirements that limited OPG's ability to obtain firearms directly and suggested that the PHPS purchase the firearms so OPG could then buy them from the Service, describing a financial benefit for the PHPS. The EA recalled him implying that the arrangement would be worthwhile and believed he may have acknowledged the potential conflict but continued with the proposal.

On September 4, 2025, the PHPSB received OPG's official request letter, which was added to the September agenda.

During the September 25, 2025, in camera meeting, Mr. Wooland declared a conflict of interest and indicated he wished to explain the letter before leaving. The Police Service Advisor intervened and advised that, because a conflict had been identified, Mr. Wooland could not address the Board. He then left the meeting. The EA recalled the Police Service Advisor urging caution, noting the perceived conflict and the concern that the Board could appear to be doing favours for a member.

The EA noted that in six years on the Board they had never seen a member declare a conflict of interest.

The EA also noted that OPG was building a nuclear facility in Wesleyville, which would require policing resources beyond the PHPS's current capacity, and that there was an interest among members of the Board and Service in maintaining a positive relationship with OPG. The PHPSB received legal advice on October 8 indicating there was no legal barrier to proceeding. The October PHPSB meeting was cancelled.

On October 24, the EA was advised by the PHPS members that, following an OPG tour, Mr. Wooland discussed the firearms acquisition in a manner that made them uncomfortable. On October 28, Mr. Wooland sent the Board a follow up email indicating he required a decision on the motion.

Interview of PHPS Inspector

During a briefing to the PHPSB about a violent offender relocating to the area, Mr. Wooland asked the Inspector for the individual's name, indicating he could conduct his own background check. This was viewed as an inappropriate request for privileged information and was not provided.

Outside of work hours, Mr. Wooland contacted the Inspector in his capacity as a Board Member and offered the services of his partner to assist with a new promotional program for the PHPS. The Inspector understood that the partner provided mentorship services and that, if this was their professional role, it would involve a cost. This felt inappropriate coming from a Board Member.

The Police Service Advisor advised that the firearms matter represented a conflict for Mr. Wooland and that he could not remain for the discussion. He accepted this direction and left the meeting.

The PHPS organized a tour of OPG due to the nuclear facility to be built in the Port Hope area at Wesleyville. Mr. Wooland did not attend the tour, however, the Inspector advised that he met the group afterward and engaged in an informal conversation in a public area, with a female employee present. During this exchange, he raised the need to move forward with the firearms acquisition, describing it as a good opportunity for PHPS, noting that others were interested, and suggesting the Service would benefit from a six-percent return. The conversation came across as a business transaction and was viewed as unprofessional for a Board Member to discuss Board-related matters in a public setting.

Interview of PHPSB Member

The Board Member did not recall Mr. Wooland requesting information about a violent offender. They did recall an incident after a Board meeting where he asked the Chief for information for his employment purposes. The Board Member questioned why he needed the information, and Mr. Wooland replied that it was for work.

The Board Member found it improper that Mr. Wooland put forward his partner to provide services to the Board when he suggested that the partner review the collective agreement.

They recalled discussions at a Board meeting where Mr. Wooland said that OPG faced bureaucratic challenges in acquiring firearms and suggested it would be easier for the PHPS to purchase the firearms and then sell them to OPG. The Board Member believed he acknowledged this as a conflict of interest and noted that no concerns were raised by the Board at the time. This was the only conflict of interest issue they encountered while serving on the Board. As a newer Member, they did not fully understand the firearm acquisition process and had concerns about the optics of a small police service purchasing firearms for a larger organization.

The Board Member did not attend the September 25, 2025, PHPSB meeting and was not aware of the Police Service Advisor's direction to Mr. Wooland or to the Board.

Following the OPG tour, the Board Member recalled Mr. Wooland stating that another police service was willing to proceed if the PHPS would not, though his preference was to work with the PHPS. The Board Member understood this to mean there would be a financial benefit to the Service. It was clear to the Board Member that he wanted the Board to decide soon and that he was acting in his OPG role, not his Board role, during the conversation at OPG.

The Chair later contacted the Board Member regarding the conversation that occurred after the tour, and the Board Member provided both a verbal and written account.

Interview of PHPS Director of Finance

The Director of Finance (DOF) stated that when they briefed the PHPSB that the Service was likely to run a deficit, Mr. Wooland suggested the issue could be addressed through an administrative fee tied to the firearms acquisition. When the DOF raised concerns about the deficit, he said the Service could be made "whole" by applying a significant administrative fee to cover the required work.

The DOF understood that Mr. Wooland wanted to bypass administrative red tape so OPG could obtain weapons more quickly than through its usual procurement process, explaining that it would be easier if the PHPS purchased the firearms and OPG then bought them from the PHPS.

At the September 25, 2025, PHPSB meeting, when the motion on the firearms acquisition was introduced, Mr. Wooland began speaking to it before the Police Service Advisor intervened and advised that he could not participate. He indicated he wanted to speak to the proposal before leaving but was advised he could not and had to leave, which he did. The DOF noted there had not been any significant conflict of interest issues in the past.

The DOF attended the OPG tour, which had been organized by the Inspector and was not related to Mr. Wooland or Board business. At the end of the tour, when the group returned to the main building, Mr. Wooland was waiting with a female individual the DOF believed to be his assistant. Almost immediately, he raised the administrative fee again and suggested a six percent rate. This was the first time a specific percentage had been mentioned. The DOF described the comment as awkward and inappropriate to raise in a public setting and believed the topic should not have been raised, as the Service was not there for that purpose and doing so did not align with the Police Service Advisor's earlier direction.

Interview of PHPS Chief of Police

The following is a summary of recollections from their perspective.

The Chief recalled that Mr. Wooland requested information about a violent offender, stating he wanted the individual's particulars so he could "run" them. The Chief believed Mr. Wooland thought he was attempting to assist but emphasized that it would have been illegal for the PHPS to provide the information. The Chief also recalled a meeting about performance management systems during which Mr. Wooland asked about discipline directives and procedures for work related to OPG. The information was not provided, and the matter was not raised again.

The Chief stated that Mr. Wooland personally offered him leadership courses, which the Chief did not pursue, but did not offer the professional services of his partner.

Regarding the firearms acquisition, the Chief stated that Mr. Wooland initiated the discussions, which were later followed by a letter from OPG outlining additional details. The Chief understood the intention was to expedite OPG's firearms acquisition through a smaller municipality due to OPG's lengthy procurement timelines and administrative delays. The Chief believed the issue had been identified as a conflict of interest but did not recall Mr. Wooland being directed not to speak about it before the September 2025 meeting.

The Chief advised that the proposal would have been more appropriate coming from another representative of OPG, with Mr. Wooland recusing himself from related discussions at Board meetings. The Chief stated that the acquisition itself was not inherently problematic and could have been mutually beneficial if pursued through appropriate channels.

To assess the legality of the proposal, the Chief consulted an RCMP firearms crime analyst to determine whether the arrangement was permissible. The advice received was that police services could legally proceed. The Board also sought separate legal advice, which reportedly aligned with that conclusion.

The Chief had further discussions with Mr. Wooland about the firearms acquisition and the potential donation of C8 rifles to the PHPS. The Chief was interested in receiving the rifles due to potential budget savings but understood the initiative should not have originated from Mr. Wooland. The Chief also stated that Mr. Wooland engaged with other PHPS members regarding both the firearms acquisition and the potential C8 donation.

The Chief recalled the Police Service Advisor intervening during a Board meeting to advise that Mr. Wooland was in a conflict of interest, after which Mr. Wooland recused himself. The Chief noted that conflicts of interest of this nature had not arisen during his tenure.

Following the OPG tour, the Chief described an incident in which Mr. Wooland, standing approximately 15 to 20 feet away in a public lobby area with a young woman beside him, called out that the firearms deal needed to be completed quickly. He stated there would be six percent in it for the Service and that another party was interested. The Chief found the comments uncomfortable and unsuitable for a public setting, particularly in front of OPG and PHPS employees and coming from a Board Member.

The Chief added that the PHPS is expected to have a closer relationship with OPG due to the planned nuclear facility in Wesleyville, which Mr. Wooland, as the head of security, will oversee. The PHPS will be responsible for supporting the site in the event of an emergency.

Subject Police Service Board Member Interview

Interview of PHPSB member Jason Wooland

Mr. Wooland is the Head of Security at OPG and is responsible for overseeing the nuclear tactical teams. He described OPG's nuclear culture as forward thinking, collaborative, and highly sharing, and stated that this may explain some of the concerns raised about his conduct. He had a slight recollection of asking for information about a dangerous offender and stated that any inquiry would have been for OPG's internal intelligence, not for personal benefit. He did not recall requesting discipline documents but acknowledged he may have asked the Chief general leadership-related questions with the intention of learning.

He said he offered volunteer support from himself and his partner to the PHPS and PHPSB, describing this as consistent with OPG's culture of sharing, and acknowledged that he may not have made the volunteer nature of the offer "crystal clear."

Mr. Wooland explained that OPG is unable to procure its own weapons due to gaps in governance requirements and policies, and that OPG previously relied on the DRPS for procurement. The firearms in use were at end of life, and a replacement order had been pending in federal procurement for more than two years. He stated that during a PHPSB meeting where revenues were being discussed, he saw an opportunity to help the PHPS and proposed the procurement initiative as a revenue opportunity. He emphasized that there would be no personal benefit to him and that both federal authorities and OPG Legal had approved the concept before it was presented. He noted that OPG cannot profit and that any administrative fee would be intended to allow the PHPS to recover overhead, administrative, and legal costs to make them "whole."

Mr. Wooland maintains that he declared a conflict of interest from the outset and that OPG was also aware. He stated he understood from the beginning that he could not participate in decision making. He further stated that OPG intentionally removed his name from the formal request letter submitted to the PHPSB prior to the September 25, 2025, meeting to mitigate the conflict.

He did not recall any conversations with the Chair about concerns raised by the Police Service Advisor and stated that he was unaware of any Board concerns about a conflict of interest related to him bringing the firearms matter forward or speaking to it prior to the September meeting.

At the September 25, 2025, meeting, Mr. Wooland stated he declared a conflict and intended to step out but remained briefly to clarify why OPG was experiencing procurement delays. He recalled that the Police Service Advisor appeared upset he was still in the room and directed him to leave, which he did. He understood this as direction that he could not participate in decision making.

Mr. Wooland stated that corporate relations organized the OPG tour. He acknowledged raising the firearms matter at the end of the tour, stating that he needed a decision and that OPG's finance team had identified a six percent administrative fee. He followed up with an email on October 28, 2025, because he had not received a response and stated he did not wish to approach another service if the PHPSB remained interested. He said he viewed himself as acting as a conduit for OPG and did not feel this was inappropriate at the time.

He explained that he interpreted the Police Service Advisor's direction as applying only to participation in decision making and did not realize it meant he should avoid speaking about the matter entirely. He stated that this misunderstanding was unfortunate and that he now understands how the direction should have been interpreted.

Mr. Wooland stated that he does not believe he contravened the Code of Conduct and emphasized that he could not have benefited personally. He expressed disappointment about how the situation unfolded, stating that his intention was to support the PHPS as it prepares for increased demands related to future nuclear development in Port Hope. He said he had spoken at Board meetings about the need to plan for the PHPS supporting the new nuclear facility in an emergency. He believed the firearms acquisition would have helped the PHPS given its limited budget. He also stated that OPG intended to donate a large portion of weapons to the PHPS and noted that, in hindsight, he may need to reconsider this given how the situation might now be interpreted. He stated he acted in good faith, consistent with OPG's culture of sharing, and regretted that the matter escalated.

Mr. Wooland advised that the experience and associated delays helped prompt corrections to the federal procurement process.

INVESTIGATION FINDINGS

I make the following findings, relying on the material and information collected during the investigation and now contained in this report:

1. **Mr. Wooland stated that he was drawing on what he described as OPG's collaborative and sharing culture when he requested information and offered assistance to PHPSB and PHPS members; however, the interactions were not received that way and were perceived by recipients as uncomfortable and improper coming from a Board Member.**
 - a. Mr. Wooland advised that his actions were not for any personal gain.
2. **There is conflicting information about whether Mr. Wooland was cautioned following the Police Service Advisor's conflict of interest concerns raised at the June 2025 PHPSB meeting.**
3. **The firearms acquisition was formally introduced by Mr. Wooland at the April 24, 2025, PHPSB meeting, and the Board passed a motion to consider procuring the weapons for OPG.**
4. **Mr. Wooland maintains that he was aware of, and declared, the conflict of interest from the beginning and understood early on that he could not be part of the decision-making process.**
 - a. Several witnesses recalled that the conflict was mentioned at the meeting.
 - b. Neither Mr. Wooland nor the witnesses recalled him being directed not to participate in discussions prior to the Police Service Advisor's direction in September.
 - c. The Chair expected another OPG representative to present the offer but did not communicate this to Mr. Wooland.
 - d. All witnesses advised they had not experienced a conflict of interest situation of this nature in their time attending Board meetings.

5. **On September 4, 2025, OPG submitted a formal letter to the Board. Mr. Wooland stated that, to mitigate his conflict of interest, OPG ensured the letter did not come from him and that it was signed by the Vice President of Security and Emergency Services.**
 - a. The email transmitting the letter was sent by Mr. Wooland's assistant and stated, "I am writing on behalf of Jason Wooland, Director of Security Operations at OPG."
6. **The formal OPG weapons acquisition request was discussed during the in-camera portion of the September 25, 2025, PHPSB meeting. Mr. Wooland declared a conflict at the beginning; however, when the agenda item came up, he began to speak to the letter. The Police Service Advisor intervened and informed him that he was not permitted to participate in any discussion or vote and was not to be involved in the matter.**
7. **On October 24, 2025, following a tour of OPG, Mr. Wooland met with members of the PHPS and one Board Member. He initiated a discussion about the firearms acquisition, stating that he needed a decision, that another party was interested, and that the PHPS would receive a six-percent administrative fee.**
 - a. Mr. Wooland stated he did not feel, at the time, that discussing the matter was inappropriate, as he believed he simply needed a decision.
 - b. The Board Member in attendance felt Mr. Wooland was acting in his OPG capacity and not as a Board Member.
 - c. Members of the Service interviewed found the interaction uncomfortable and inappropriate in a public setting and coming from a Board Member.
8. **On October 28, 2025, Mr. Wooland emailed the Board stating that he needed a decision on the firearms acquisition and did not want to approach another service if the PHPSB remained interested. He stated that he viewed himself as the conduit between OPG and the PHPSB.**

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